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such inquiry, the defendant should be precluded from claiming
good faith under the error of law. The result would thus be
that she was in "moral," but not "legal," good faith and thereby
prevented from acquiring the property by the ten-year acquisitive prescription.
In view of the established jurisprudence the case seems unsound, and it should not be indicative of a change of rule, since
the issue of good faith apparently was not litigated or brought
to the attention of the court. It is submitted that a person attempting to purchase immovable property from a woman should
have a duty to determine the marital status of the woman and
her ability to alienate such property. 22 Failing to make an appropriate investigation into the matter, the purchaser would be
precluded from invoking his good faith under a plea of ten-year
acquisitive prescription.
H. D. Salassi, Jr.

SALES-THE AUTHORITY TO SIQN FOR ANOTHER IN CONVEYING
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

The Louisiana Civil Code requires transfers of immovable
property to be in writing, and prohibits the introduction of parol/
evidence to vary the terms of a written conveyance or to prove
an, oral sale of real estate.' The sole exception to this rule is that
an oral conveyance of immovables may be proved by confession
under oath in answer to interrogatories, but only if there has
2
been actual delivery.
Under the French Civil Code parol evidence is admissible
to prove a sale if there is written evidence, emanating from the
person against whom the claim is made, which makes probable
the facts alleged.3 French doctrine declares the following writings to be among those sufficient to form a basis for "beginning
of proof": books of commerce; domestic papers; letters, whether
addressed to the person who is beginning the proof or to a third
22. Ibid.
1. LA. CIVIL CoDe arts. 2275, 2276, 2440 (1870).
2. Id. arts. 2275, 2276.
8. FBEnI
Crvmr Com art. 1347.
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person; and written declarations. 4 The Louisiana Civil Code of
1808 contained a similar provision, but it was not included in
the later codes, and an early case held that the doctrine of "beginning of proof" was no longer the law of Louisiana. 5
The manifest purpose of the requirement of a writing is to
diminish the chance of fraud. The writing serves as evidence of
the transfer of the immovable and it is elementary that in order
for an authentic act to be valid and admissible in evidence, it
must be signed by parties to the transfer." Regarding acts under
private signature a different rule applies. It is not necessary
that the purchaser sign a deed in order to show an acceptance
of the purchase. The going into possession by the purchaser of
land shows an acceptance of the deed and removes the need for
his signature. 7 Although an act of sale may not qualify as an
authentic act through some defect in form, it is still valid between the parties as a private writing, if signed by the parties.8
Since an authentic act is valid and admissible in evidence
only if signed by the parties, the question arises what will constitute a party's signature. The courts have consistently held
that a person's mark, when established by legal evidence, is a
sufficient substitute for his signature for every purpose except
an olographic will. 9 The typical mark substituted for a person's
4. See 12 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 764 (5th ed.
1922).
5. Patterson v. Bloss, 4 La. 374 (1832).
6. Baker v. Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115 (1910) ; Dick v. Maxwell, 6
Mart.(N.S.) 396 (La. 1828) (unsigned partnership project; an incomplete instrument not signed by the parties is inadmissible in evidence) ; Lombard v. Guilliet
and Wife, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 453 (La. 1822) (party named in a notarial act but who
did not sign was not bound).
7. Megason v. Boleyn Lumber Co., 140 La. 431, 73 So. 257 (1916) ; Franks
v. Scott, 191 So. 175 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2235 (1870) ; Hood v. Segrest, 12 Rob. 210 (La.
1845).
9. See, e.g., Zacharie v. Franklin, 37 U.S. 151 (1838) ; Agurs v. Belcher &
Creswell, 111 La. 378, 35 So. 607 (1903) ; Fadaol v. Rideau, 13 La. App. 551,
128 So. 193 (1st Cir. 1930).
In Zacharie the United States Supreme Court quoted the following language,
which is taken from the earlier Louisiana case of Tagiasco v. Molinari's Heirs,
9 La. 512, 519 (1836) : " 'The force and effect to be given to instruments which
have for signatures only the ordinary marks of the parties to them, depend more
upon rules of evidence than the dicta of law, relating to the validity of contracts
required to be made in writing. The genuineness of instruments 'under private
signature, depends on proof. And in all cases, when they are established by legal
evidence, instruments signed by the ordinary mark of a person incapable of
writing his own name, ought to be held as written evidence.' "
The Agurs case presented the interesting situation where one Willie Johnson,
who was unable to write his name, appeared before a notary and two witnesses
to execute an act of sale. The notary inadvertently wrote the name Willie Jones,
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written signature is an "X" which is placed between the person's
given name and surname. Literate persons have been allowed
to use their mark instead of their signature when physically
10
disabled in some way.
The question arises whether a person can confer authority
on another to sign for him as his agent, and, if so, in what instances. Can a person confer authority on an agent to sign a
written instrument transferring immovable property, if the authority to sign is not given by a written agreement? It is well
settled that an enforceable agency or power of attorney to sell
immovables must be in writing." However, creating an agency
to sell immovables differs from giving an agent the authority to
sign an authentic act or written instrument transferring an immovable. The primary difference between an agency to sell and
an agency to sign an instrument in the conveyance of real estate
is that in the former the agent handles the negotiations with the
vendee, whereas in the latter the agent merely affixes his principal's signature to the written transaction. Article 2234 of the
Civil Code states in part that "the authentic act, as relates to
contracts, is that which has been executed before a notary public
or other officer authorized to execute such functions, in presence
of two witnesses, aged at least fourteen years, or of three witnesses, if a party be blind. If a party does not know how to sign,
the notary must cause him to affix his mark to the' instrument."
(Emphasis added.) Literally interpreted, article 2234 apparently
does not apply to an individual physically unable to sign his
name or make a mark. Thus it seems that an afflicted individual
would not be precluded from creating a valid verbal agency to
sign by article 2234. However, due to the lack of jurisprudence
and Johnson inserted his "X" between his given name and the incorrect surname.
It was held that this conveyed the property described in the act of sale, on the
theory that the signature was completed when the vendor made the "X" on the
instrument.
. 10. See Waggoner v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 203 La. 1071, 14 So. 2d 855
(1943), where some of the persons whose marks appeared on the petition were
sick or so afflicted that they could not sign at the time the petition was presented
to them.
11. Bordelon v. Crabtree, 216 La. 345, 43 So. 2d 682 (1949) ; Triangle Farms
v., Harvey, 178 La. 559, 152 So. 124 (1934) ; St. Landry State Bank v. Meyers,
52 La. Ann. 1769, 28 So. 136 (1898); Dohan v. Dohan, 42 La. Ann. 449, 7 So.
569 '(1890) ; Succession of Edwards, 34 La. Ann. 216 (1882) ; Hackenburg v.
Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 900 (1878); Chapman v. Hardesty, 10 Rob. 34 (La.
1845) ; Miller v. Canal & Banking Co., 8 Rob. 236 (La. 1844) ; Badon v. Badon,
4 La. 166 (1832) ; Muggah v. Greig, 2 La. 593 (1831) ; Hall v. Sprigg, 7 Mart.
(O.S.) 243 (La. 1819) ; Landry v. Blache, 17 La. App. 670, 137 So. 208 (OrL
. I
1 ' "1 1 . "
Cir. 1931 ).
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in this area, it is unclear whether a vendor, either afflicted or
illiterate, can create a valid agency to sign an instrument transferring immovable property. The Supreme Court first encountered the problem of the legal effect of a person's signature made
by another in a transaction involving immovables. in the wellknown case Meyer v. King.4 The question arose whether King's
son could validly bind his father by signing his father's name,
with his father's consent, to a counter-letter. Objection was
made on the ground that the authority to sign such a document
can be proved only by a written act. The court held that the
authority to sign another's name to a single act, if done by order
of, and in the presence of the principal, need not be in writing. 18
It should be noted that the Meyer case dealt mainly with the
signing of a counter-letter and an authentic act was not at issue.
The remainder of the cases permitting a verbal agency to
sign for another deal with movable property. In re Deshoteis
tate 4 was concerned with the validity of the, administrator's
ackiow,edgment of a sl ccession debt. In sustaining the ace
mowledgment the court held that although the administrator
was illiterate a-d. did not actually place his mark on the. doeur.4pnt, "the facts and circumstances surrounding the eltire
Matter, however, satisfy us that he either touched the pen, when
tJAe, mark was made, or that it was made in his presence, with
his knowledge, consent, and approval, either of which we think
,ufficie,.
The. touchipg of the pen is a mere symbolic actr p rvilng ;1Q other purposq, than to show consent to the maipg of the
4ark, It,
issu iciept, when it,
appears that th m.ark was me
in t he presec,e, of th

party whose signatq.eq it purpgrts to be,

with. hi4 knowedge 4nd cqps nt."' 5 (Emphasis added.)
Coats v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.lq followed the Deshutels
reaQning in hoilding that, an
egicy to transfer negotiable instruments need not be in writing. The court declared that "'where
a person's, name is signed for him. at- hia direcqtj04 and in.his
2.?La.A, q67 (1877,
92.
13. Id. at 570. The court also stated in dictum that "the counter-lettetr wqvA
ioqt the makndate, bi t the act ggned for, in presence anid un4er the "ms4tructions of
the pen.t.
at autho ty was delegate for only on5e ohjee, W s notto Ie
exercised out of the. interested parties' presence, lasted tlq, space of time required
tq write q name, and expired when the last letter of t.e pincip al'q pme flI
#ox
the agent,'a pen. 111'such a case the act Welt. s the, actCof'th
ripi
RO,t 9 the 40t." ibi.

15. d,at 10W,

So. at 294.

16. 174 La. 503, 141 So. 41 (1932).
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presence 'by am6t-h'er,'t'e aigniture b'ecomes his 'own, ,and'is "sulfidieiit'to give the same -vaidi-tyto'anqingtrument'as 'though written by the person himself.'

17

-Anotherisighificant -decision'on -ignatures made by tan agent
for lainother was rendered by the -Supreme 'Coufit in 'Waggoner
v. 'Grant Parish Police Jury' in which a petition calling for a
local option leledtion was under -attack. 'The court, relying heavily
on -theMeyer case, had little'hesitancy in -holding that"'the signatures written ton 'the petition :by the 'hand of another in the 'presence ;and :at the direction of *the voters in this case have the
same ,validity as ,though written by the voters themselves."' 9 'In
further justification of 'its position the court stated that "a
signature -may also be made for a person by the hand'of 'another,
acting in 'his presence, and 'at -his direction, request, or acquiescense, unless a :statute provides 'otherwise, and has the same
validity as though written -by the person himself." 2 The 'position taken by 'the 'court in the Coats and Waggoner :cases 'has
2
continued to be followed :in 'recent decisions. '
The recent case of Elmore v. Butler 2 presented the xes nova
queition whether the alleged vendor could create -a valid !oral
agency to sign an instrument transferring immovable property.
Plaintiffs attacked the sale on the grounds that 'the .notary
signed the authentic act for the alleged vendor without such
authority being given to the -notary by a written .agreement.
Additionally, plaintiffs contended that requiring the alleged "vendor to sign by affixing his usual mark, if he knew not how to
sign his name, 'would have been the only dternative to an actual
signature by the vendor in the absence of a written agreement
conferring authority upon the notary as agent to sign for him.
The Second Circuit, relying on the prior jurisprudence which
deals mainly, if not exclusively, with :movables, 'held that "the
signature "of Elmore 'affixed to a deed 'by a ndtary, where 'the
'17. Id. at .509, 141 4.So. fit'43.
18. 203 'La. 1071, _1 So.:2d '855 (1948').
19. Id. at 1081, 14 So. 2d at 858.
,20. 'Tbid.
-21. ,State 'ex rel. Langridge v. Harris, 138 ,So. 2d 197 (La. App. .4th 'ir.
1962) ; 'Perdido Fin. Co. v. Falgout, 77 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
:22. "169 So.12d 11.7 (La. kpp. 12d Cir. 19641).

In Elmore the 'authefitic 'act 'of

sale was executed 'some Ihirty-seven -years before 'the ,case was ,brought to trial,
and the vendor's signature was admittedly forged by the notary public tbefore

Whom Ithe :act was ,passed. The only living member df the 'group 'shown to 'have
accompanied the vendor to the -office of the -notary 'and "who 'testified 'that ahe :saw
the deed executed was a party defendant to the suit.
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former was present authorizing, aiding and consenting, became
the signature of the vendor and the deed thus effectively con'23
veyed the property in question.
It appears that plaintiff's contention that the vendor must
actually sign the authentic act or place his mark on the document is supported by article 2234 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which says that "if a party does not know how to sign, the
notary must cause him to affix his mark to the instrument."
(Emphasis added.) A valid argument could be made that the
sanctity of the requirement of a writing in transferring immovable property should not be violated by allowing a person
to confer authority on an agent to sign a deed or document transferring immovable property unless such authority is given in
writing. After all, this would conform with the requirement
of article 2275 which says that every transfer of immovable
property must be in writing. One can easily see the problems
which might arise if the holding of the Elmore case were to be
extended to the point where an agent could sign for his principal
outside of the principal's presence. The possibility of fraud in
such a case is self-evident. Anyone could claim he was the agent
of the owner of real estate and thus transfer the owner's property to a third party without the owner's consent. Fortunately,
such an extension of the agency to sign has not been permitted
by the courts. In all the cases where an agency to sign has been
granted, the principal was present when the agent did the
signing.
It is submitted that the Elmore decision is basically sound if
limited to instances in which the disabled principal is present
when the agent signs for him. Practical considerations favor
the view that if the disabled principal is present, his signature
or mark may be validly affixed by another at his direction. A
contrary rule would deprive a person unable to sign his name or
affix his mark of the capacity to act when a writing is required.
Hence, the affixing of his mark should and does suffice. Since
there is hardly any way to determine whether a mark was made
by one person or another, it should make no difference that the
mark is affixed by another for the disabled principal. The formality of having the party touch the pen is meaningless and
the rule which dispenses with this insignificant gesture commends itself to reason. Yet it should not be extended to the
23. Id. at 721.
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case where the person to be bound is not physically present when
the act is performed for him. The necessities of the situation
do not demand a further relaxation of the requirement of a
written signature.
KENNETH E. GORDON, JR.

SUCCESSIONS-

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION FOR COLLATION

In a recently decided case' the Louisiana Supreme Court
purported to put to rest the undecided 2 issue of the prescriptive
period applicable to a demand for collation. Whether the court's
pronouncement that the demand prescribed in ten years from
the donor's death can be considered conclusive authority is beclouded by the context in which the issue was joined. This
uncertainty, together with the prior confusion surrounding the
proper classification of collation for prescription, especially warrants a close examination of the decision in light of prior jurisprudence and pertinent statutory provisions.
No Louisiana statute specifically governs prescription of the
action for collation, but, arguably, any one of the provisions
for five, ten, or thirty years could be applied. Civil Code article
3542 provides that actions to reduce excessive donations prescribe in five years. Under article 3544 "all personal actions,"
not previously provided for specifically, prescribe in ten years.
As long as heirs hold a succession in common, the action by any
one of them to partition the succession remains imprescriptible
under article 1304. If, however, one heir has separately and
continuously possessed all or a portion of the succession adversely for thirty years, the other heirs are barred from demanding a partition of the property so possessed. 3 Authorities
1. Succession of Webre, 172 So. 2d 285 (La. 1965).
2. In Naudon v. Mauvezin, 194 La. 739, 194 So. 766 (1940) an action for
collation was held prescribed in five years under Civil Code article 3542, but this
holding was apparently overruled sub silentio in Himel v. Connely, 195 La. 769,
197 So. 424 (1940). See notes 4-8 infra and accompanying text.
3. LA. CIV CODE art. 1305 (1870) : "When one of the heirs has enjoyed the
whole or part of the succession separately, or all the coheirs have possessed sepa*rately each a portion of the hereditary effects, he or they who have thus separately
possessed, can successfully oppose the suit for a partition of the effects of the
succession, if their possession has continued thirty years without interruption."
Id. art. 1306: "If there be 'but one of the heirs who has separately enjoyed a
portion of the effects of the succession during thirty years, and all the other
heirs have possessed the residue of the effects of the succession in common, the

